Fisher, Gregg, and Weinstein: A Prescription for What's Ailing ACOs
Dr. Elliott Fisher, former Senator Judd Gregg (R-NH), and Dr. James Weinstein penned an op-ed published in Modern Healthcare discussing the need to move away from fee-for-service and towards accountable and effective care in Medicare. They discussed findings of a collaboration between the Dartmouth Institute, Dartmouth-Hitchock Health, and the Campaign to Fix the Debt to create a number of suggestions for establishing better Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) through improving the financial model and patient engagement. The full findings are available as a white paper, released yesterday.
They noted the quick timeline that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has established for moving to new payment models and the difficulties ACO implementation has faced thus far:
HHS is seeking to tie 85% of traditional Medicare payments to quality or value by the end of 2016 and 90% by the end of 2018; and having 30% of Medicare payments in alternative payment models—such as ACOs—by the end of 2016 and more than 50% by 2018.
Transitioning away from fee-for-service payment at such a pace, however, will require major improvements to alternative payment models and additional reforms, some of which may require Congress to act.
ACOs in Medicare—the largest alternative payment model—continue to grow in number, with 424 organizations now serving roughly 7.8 million beneficiaries, mostly within the Medicare Shared Savings Program. However, while the early results of the Medicare ACO programs are in many ways promising, they also highlight the need for further changes. Initial data on financial performance show that only about one-quarter saved enough money to generate shared savings. Many ACO beneficiaries are unaware that they are receiving care from the ACO and seek it from non-ACO specialists or healthcare agencies, making it difficult for the physicians in their ACO to coordinate and improve their care.
The solution to fixing ACOs, they write, lies in two separate strategies.
First, the financial model for ACOs should offer them a greater share of their initial savings (to help fund start-up costs), provide stronger incentives to induce and maintain participation from low-cost provider organizations, and foster alignment of payment schemes across all payer types—not just in Medicare. This strategy will encourage the growth of shared-savings models and motivate high-performing healthcare systems to join the ACO programs.
The second strategy would improve patient engagement in ACOs by modifying how Medicare beneficiaries are assigned to an ACO: Beneficiaries should be given the opportunity to choose to join their ACO; for those not actively choosing, those eligible should be assigned at the beginning of the year (so that their ACO can contact them). Medicare should also test a benefit design that uses modest financial incentives to encourage patients to seek care within their ACO or from providers outside the ACO whom the ACO recommends. Simultaneously, to make such incentives possible, supplemental Medicare plans should be restricted from covering first-dollar beneficiary costs for non-ACO services.
As we have written, Medicare faces many funding challenges that require serious improvements to remain sustainable for the long-term. This paper is one way that the program can build on existing delivery system efforts to more efficiently provide care to Medicare beneficiaries.